A bargainer uses "take it or leave it" offers to signal that he is not willing to make further concessions (commitment threat) and that he will leave the bargaining table unless his demand is accepted (exit threat). This paper investigates the impact of these threats on rational negotiators' equilibrium shares and behavior in a bilateral negotiation. The threats are credible because the negotiators are assumed to have the opportunity of mimicking obstinate types-who, for some reason, are constrained to implement their threats-and to build reputation on their obstinacy. The existence of the endogenous deadline option for one of the players has two main effects: (1) it renders the deal unique and efficient, and (2) shifts the bargaining power towards the player who can influence the deadline.
Introduction
In episode 13 (season 6) of the famous TV series House M.D., the main story revolves around the last eight hours of a critical negotiation between Lisa Cuddy (the dean of Medicine and hospital administrator of the fictional Princeton-Plainsboro Teaching Hospital in New Jersey) and a contract negotiator from Atlantic Net Insurance (the largest insurance company in the area) to renew a contract. Dr. Cuddy and the contract negotiator have been arguing about the contract for eight months, and that day, Dr. Cuddy lays it all on the line. When they meet at 8:30 a.m., Dr. Cuddy makes her final offer that she agrees to capitated care but wants a 12% increase in rates. The contract negotiator refuses Dr. Cuddy's offer immediately. Then she tells him that this is the hospital's final offer and he has until 3:00 p.m. to agree, or she will make a public announcement that they are no longer accepting Atlantic Net. At noon, Dr. Cuddy heads into the board meeting where the board makes it clear that her job is on the line if she cannot renew the contract with Atlantic Net. Dr. Cuddy tracks down the CEO of Atlantic Net at lunch and confronts him about the contract. He blows her off and tells her that her tactic will not work. However, Dr. Cuddy does not back down. The negotiator from Atlantic Net returns and offers an 8% increase as their final offer, and Dr. Cuddy declines and wants the full 12%. After a few stressful hours of waiting, the story ends with good news for Dr. Cuddy. The negotiator revisits her just before 3:00 p.m. (the deadline) and tells her that the company has agreed to her 12% proposal.
Negotiators commonly use "take it or leave it" offers as a final strategic maneuver in order to push their rivals towards more acceptable terms (e.g., labor negotiations). It usually begins with a milder threat such as "That is my final offer," and if it does not work, it escalates to a higher level: "Take this one or I am calling off the negotiation." If the bargainers' offers do not get closer to each other after a lengthy delay, followed by offers and counteroffers, then the "take it or leave it" offer could be an optimal strategy to speed things up. This paper is not interested in explaining how negotiators come to this point at the first place, where they threaten each other so vigorously. Instead, the focus is investigating the impacts of these bluffs on rational negotiators' equilibrium strategies and shares in a bilateral negotiation and examining a possible case where the threatened negotiator can mitigate the impacts of these bluffs.
Intimidating the opponent with a threat of not making further concessions (i.e., commitment threat) or of leaving the bargaining table (i.e., exit threat) would increase the equilibrium share of a bargainer only if they are credible. In this paper, I follow a reputational approach for both commitment and exit threats. For this purpose, I study a stylized four-stage infinite-horizon and continuous-time bargaining game that is adapted from Kambe (1999) . The novel twist is that one of the agents announces a deadline for agreement. In particular, there are four defining features of the model. First, two negotiators bargain over the division of a surplus; negotiators begin with announcing their demands. Second, in case the demands are incompatible, negotiator 1 declares a deadline for agreement. Third, they face some small probability of becoming committed to their demands, and for negotiator 1, to walking away at the self-imposed deadline. Fourth, the negotiation phase adopts a war of attrition protocol. During the negotiation phase, each agent knows his type (obstinate or flexible) but is unsure about the opponent's true type. This uncertainty provides incentives to the flexible negotiators to build reputation on their obstinacy, affecting the flexible negotiators' equilibrium play.
This exercise is important for two reasons. First, commitment and exit threats are studied separately in the bargaining literature, but the current work is the first one that combines these two. Second, allowing a negotiator to leave the bargaining table imposes an endogenous deadline for reputation building that has not been studied in the bargaining and reputation literature before. 1 Exit-threat appears to be an important tactic in reality, but it is usually used together with other threats (e.g., commitment) as a last resort. A weak negotiator, whose opponent has strong bargaining power due to his ability to commit (e.g., reputational advantage), can make his commitments less credible or likely to be effective by using exit-threat. This link has not been explored in the literature, and the current study offers a mechanism to explain this link.
The analysis reveals that the key feature is that negotiator 1 chooses as early a deadline as possible with the constraint that she must have sufficient time to build a reputation for stubbornnessẑ 1 (t), which is increasing over time, so that negotiator 2 strictly prefers accepting negotiator 1's offer when the deadline K is reached rather than inducing an impasse without a deal with probabilityẑ 1 (K). Agreement is immediate because the negotiators forecast this deadline strategy when choosing their bargaining postures and negotiator 2 adopts the greatest just compatible posture. Thus, the existence of the endogenous deadline option for one of the players has two main effects (vis-a-vis Kambe, 1999 and Gul, 2000) : (1) it renders the deal unique and efficient, and (2) shifts the bargaining power towards (and thus increases the share of) the player who can influence the deadline.
Kambe (1999) studies a simpler version of the current model, where none of the negotiators has the option of using exit threat. He shows that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes, some of which are inefficient. However, the set of equilibrium outcomes always contains an efficient allocation, and the negotiators' equilibrium demands get closer to this efficient allocation as the negotiators's commitment probabilities approach zero. For example, if the negotiators' time preferences and commitment probabilities are the same, then Kambe (1999) proves that each negotiator demands the half of the surplus (i.e., 0.5) or something closer to that. This paper, on 1 Compte and Jehiel (2002) consider a discrete-time bilateral bargaining problem in an Abreu-Gul setting and explore the role of exogenous outside options. They show that if both agents' outside options dominate yielding to the commitment type, then there is no point in building a reputation for inflexibility, and the unique equilibrium is again the Rubinstein (1982) outcome. Ozyurt (2015 a&b) study a three-player war of attrition game in a competitive environment, where one of the players has the option of leaving his bargaining partner to negotiate with the other. However, Ozyurt (2015 a&b) assumes that the negotiator-who goes back and forth between his opponents-has no commitment for a specific deadline and is free to revisit his bargaining partners as as much as he wants.
the other hand, shows that negotiator 1 can improve his share and payoff approximately 40% when each negotiator's commitment probability is 0.1, and 27.6% when this probability is only 0.01.
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In equilibrium, conditional on that negotiators' initial offers are incompatible, negotiator 1 always chooses the exit-time/deadline different from 0. The equilibrium value of the exit-time (i.e., K) is a function of the following: both negotiators' initial demands α 1 and α 2 (where α i ∈ [0, 1] denotes negotiator i's share of the surplus), the prior probability that negotiator 1 is the obstinate type (i.e., 1's commitment probability), and negotiator 2's time preferences. If negotiator 2 is more patient, then the deadline is longer (i.e., K is bigger). On the other hand, as negotiator 2 gets more impatient, then negotiator 1 chooses a shorter deadline. Put differently, negotiator 1 applies more time pressure on her rival (by shortening the deadline) if her rival is impatient.
Fixing the negotiators' incompatible initial demands, a shorter deadline (i.e., smaller K) increases negotiator 1's expected payoff if the deadline is not too short. That is, the bigger the time pressure negotiator 1 would impose on her rival, the earlier her rival would concede, and thus, the more surplus (in ex-ante terms) negotiator 1 could extract. However, in equilibrium, negotiator 1 never chooses a deadline so close to 0: This is true because (1) such an immediate exit threat is credible only if negotiator 1's initial demand (i.e., α 1 ) is very close to 1 − α 2 (i.e., negotiator 1's demand is almost compatible), and (2) negotiator 1 could increase her expected payoff by choosing an extended deadline and a more aggressive demand. The bottom line is that there is a trade-off between aggressiveness in demand and the length of a deadline in the exit threat.
In equilibrium, negotiators never choose extreme demands. The exit threat always makes agent 1 advantageous in the sense that if both agents' time preferences and commitment probabilities are the same, then negotiator 1's equilibrium share is greater than negotiator 2's. Equilibrium strategies, including the negotiators' initial demands, are unique. This unique equilibrium is efficient in the sense that negotiator 1 offersᾱ 1 , which is a function of both negotiators' commitment probabilities and time preferences, and negotiator 2 offers 1 −ᾱ 1 and ends the game with no delay. The intuition behind this uniqueness result is as follows: First, if negotiator 1's initial offer is less than or equal toᾱ 1 , then negotiator 1 can always choose her deadline K in such a way that she is the "strong" negotiator and her opponent is the "weak " negotiator in the game. Being the strong negotiator in the game is more desirable than being the weak negotiator. In equilibrium where the negotiators' initial demands are α 1 and α 2 , expected payoff of the weak negotiator 2 is less than (or equal, if the demands are compatible) to 1 − α 1 . Second, given the negotiators' equilibrium payoffs, negotiator 2's best reply is to make a compatible offer and to finish the game in the first stage. Finally, given the second negotiator's best response, 2 Please see example 1 in page 15. the optimal strategy for the first negotiator is to make the highest offer possible, which isᾱ 1 .
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Unlike Crawford (1982), Muthoo (1996) , and Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) , rationalizing the players' commitment is not a concern for this paper. I take that mechanism as given and assume that prior to their demand (and deadline) selections, the negotiators are uncertain whether they will commit or not. Nevertheless, commitment is risky and costly for the negotiators because it involves a possibility of an impasse and 0 payoff. If the negotiators insure themselves against the cost of commitment (e.g., through a pre-agreement that is signed privately with their principals), then they may take higher risks with more aggressive demands/deadline. Insurance can be a negotiator's informational advantage (vis-a-vis his opponent) at the beginning of the game about his future-self.
The second negotiator, who is not able to choose a deadline, can diminish the effects of his rival's exit threat by insuring himself against some of the utility loss he will suffer when he commits to his demand. I will prove the results for a "partial-insurance" case where the compensation amounts are minimal. However, various other insurance schemes would yield the same results. Negotiator 2's share and expected payoff are higher in the partial-insurance case. The reason for this result is simple. When negotiator 2 is partially insured, he will be protected against the risk of an impasse (and 0 payoff) in case he commits to his demand. As a result of this, negotiator 2 will be able to make more aggressive initial demands, which partially neutralizes the effects of negotiator 1's exit threat. There are multiple equilibrium demands when negotiators are partially insured. The upper bound for negotiator 1's initial offers isᾱ 1 .
That is, the efficient outcome of the no-insurance case is just one of the equilibrium outcomes in the partial-insurance case; all the others are inefficient because the negotiators' demands are incompatible and there is some (probabilistic) delay in reaching agreement. In any equilibrium under the partial-insurance case, where negotiators' initial offers are α 1 and α 2 , negotiator 2 is always weak in the game, but his expected payoff is 1 − α 1 . Although negotiator 2's expected payoff in the game is exactly equal to what he can achieve by conceding to negotiator 1 right away, the temptation of reaching a better deal (where negotiator 1 accepts α 2 with some positive probability) causes a delay in equilibrium. However, this temptation fades away when there is no insurance. Section 2 explains the details of the infinite-horizon bargaining game. Section 3 presents the main results of the study. Section 4 considers the bargaining phase (i.e., the concession game) and characterizes the concession strategies. Section 5 discusses some extensions, and Section 6 concludes and discusses the related literature.
Preliminaries
Two negotiators, 1 (she) and 2 (he), bargain over the division of a surplus. For i ∈ {1, 2}, negotiator i's rate of time preference is r i . The bargaining game between the negotiators is a four-stage infinite-horizon, continuous-time game. All stages start at time 0, and the first three stages also end at time 0. In stage 1, negotiators simultaneously demand a share of the surplus. Let α i ∈ [0, 1] denote negotiator i's first-stage demand. If the negotiators' demands are compatible (i.e., α 1 + α 2 ≤ 1), then the game ends, and one of the two divisions of surplus If agreement is never reached, the negotiators also receive 0. Both negotiators are risk neutral.
If the game finishes at time t ≥ 0 with negotiator i's concession, then the payoffs to negotiators i and j are (1 − α j )e −r i t and α j e −r j t , respectively. move that determine whether their agents will commit for the rest of the bargaining game or not. Thus, a privately signed pre-agreement between a negotiator and his principal, ensuring that the principal will not force the agent to commit, could work as an insurance. An important question naturally arises when an effective insurance exists: which negotiator will benefit from such an insurance? This is investigated in the second part of Section 3.
The Information Structure and Obstinate Types: The only source of uncertainty in the game is the negotiators' actual types, and it matters only in the fourth stage of the game.
In the first two stages, all negotiators choose their strategies, given their beliefs, to maximize their expected payoffs, and this is common knowledge. However, following the third stage, a negotiator is either flexible or obstinate. As is standard in the literature, the obstinate types never back down from their demands. In addition to this, the obstinate type of negotiator 1 leaves the bargaining game at time K (in particular, at stage K 1 ) that negotiator 1 announced in stage 1. 
Note that flexible negotiator 1 receives the payoff of 0 if she leaves the bargaining table.
Hence, it is never optimal for her to leave the bargaining game. For this reason, I ignore flexible negotiator 1's exit strategies. Suppose that negotiators' strategies are α 1 , α 2 , and K in the first two stages and F 1 and F 2 in the fourth stage. Therefore, given that negotiator i receives message d in stage 3, flexible negotiator i's expected payoff of conceding to negotiator j at time t is
with B j (t − ) = (1 − z j ) lim y↑t F j (y). Moreover, given that negotiator i receives the message c in the third stage, obstinate negotiator i's expected payoff in the fourth stage is
Therefore, negotiator i's expected payoff in the game is
5 Note that y∈[0,∞) e −riy dB j (y) = B j (0) + ∞ 0 e −riy dB j (y). 6 The payoffs presented in (1) and (2) are calculated at the beginning of stage 4, that is after the nature's move. However, the payoff in (3) is calculated before the nature's move.
A Benchmark Result
Kambe (1999) considers a simpler version of the current model, where none of the negotiators can exit the game and announce an exit time. Therefore, the negotiators' concession game strategies are as given by Abreu and Gul (2000) . Kambe shows that the immediate settlement
2 ) is an equilibrium outcome, where
Therefore, if the negotiators are identical, then x * i = 0.5 for each i is an equilibrium outcome. There are other (inefficient) equilibrium outcomes where each negotiator demands a share that is not too far from 0.5.
Main Results
I describe flexible negotiator i's behavior in the concession game by a probability distribution over concession times, F i (t) = P r(flexible i will quit prior to t), where we allow F i (0) > 0, so i may concede immediately with positive probability. Let λ i (t) be flexible negotiator i's instantaneous concession (or hazard) rate at time t conditional on that no negotiator has conceded before this time. That is, λ i (t) =
. Here we look for an equilibrium where flexible negotiator j mixes between accepting α i and waiting.
8 Therefore, flexible j is indifferent between conceding at time t and waiting for an infinitesimal period ∆ and then conceding at time t + ∆ < K, where K is negotiator 1's deadline announcement in stage 2, if and only if
where λ i (t)∆ is the probability that i concedes during the interval ∆. Solving this equation for λ i (t) and taking its limit as ∆ approaches 0 yields
Integrating up the hazard rate gives 7 Kambe claims that there are multiple equilibria and negotiator i's equilibrium demands are in an neighborhood of x * i , where is a factor of the probability that both negotiators are obstinate (i.e., z 1 z 2 ). However, he does not provide a formal statement or a proof. 8 In the next section, I formally prove that there is no pure strategy equilibrium of the concession game (see Propositions 2 and 3).
Therefore, if negotiator 1 chooses K > 0, negotiators' equilibrium strategies are somewhat constrained by the fixed hazard rates λ 1 and λ 2 . Different values of K > 0 will change the horizon of the game G, beyond which no negotiator will concede. Thus, the equilibrium values of F 1 (0) and F 2 (0) will change with K.
A weak negotiator, whose opponent has strong bargaining power due to his ability to commit, can make his commitments less credible or likely to be effective by using exit-threat. This link is explored in this study. To understand the mechanism that explains this link, suppose for now that the negotiators have identical demands and time preferences (i.e., α i = α > 1/2 and r i = r for i = 1, 2), but negotiator 2 has a reputational advantage (i.e., z 2 > z 1 ). In equilibrium, the negotiators' concession game strategies, F 1 (t) and F 2 (t), must be continuous and increasing functions of t with a uniquely determined hazard (growth) rate λ = r(1−α) 2α−1 as briefly discussed above. Concession game strategies may have jumps only at t = 0, but we must
That is, in equilibrium, both negotiators cannot concede with positive probabilities at t = 0 because j would always want to wait for some small > 0 amount of time in order to enjoy the discrete chance of i quitting. However, the identity of the negotiator who concedes with a positive probability at t = 0 is critical for players' equilibrium payoffs. If negotiator j concedes with a positive probability at time 0 (i.e., F j (0) > 0), then negotiator i's payoff is strictly positive (i.e., negotiator i is strong), and his opponent's (i.e., negotiator j's) game payoff is strictly smaller than i's payoff. For this reason, we call negotiator j as the weak negotiator. Finally, given the flexible negotiator i's strategy, his reputation at time t (conditional on that the game has not yet finished) is given by the Bayes' rule aŝ
.
These claims are standard results in the bargaining and reputation literature.
Now suppose that negotiator 1 cannot pick a deadline, and so we are in the world of Kambe (1999) or Abreu and Gul (2000) . The negotiators' reputation functionsẑ * 1 (t) andẑ * 2 (t) in equilibrium must look like those in Figure 1b . That is, negotiator 1 must concede at time 0 with a positive probability, and so the value of her reputation function at time 0 (i.e.,ẑ * 1 (0)) is strictly higher than z 1 , and she is the weak negotiator in the game.
The intuition for this result is simple: Suppose for a contradiction that none of the negotiators concede at time 0. In that case, the negotiators' reputation functions must look like those in Figure 1a . Because z 2 > z 1 and both players' reputations grow at the same rate, negotiator 2's reputation must reach one earlier. Let τ i denote the time at which negotiator i's reputation reach one. Negotiator 1 should not continue to concede (or delay her concession) beyond time τ 2 as inẑ 1 (t) because she learns at this time that her opponent is obstinate, contradicting with the optimality of equilibrium. The same logic applies to the case where negotiator 2 concedes at time 0. Thus, since both negotiators cannot concede at the same time, equilibrium strategies should yield reputation functions as those presented in Figure 1b . Now, I will explain how negotiator 1 can turn this disadvantaged situation into her advantage by declaring a deadline. Negotiator 1 first calculates p H , which is negotiator 1's reputation level at the time of deadline that makes negotiator 2 indifferent between conceding to negotiator 1 and waiting for her concession. Therefore, it is a function of α 1 and α 2 only. Suppose that p H is sufficiently low as given in Figure 1c . Then, the optimality of equilibrium implies that negotiator 1 should announce her deadline as K * and negotiator 2 should concede to negotiator 1 with a positive probability at time 0 (see Figure 1d ), implying that negotiator 1 will be the strong negotiator with a higher payoff.
If negotiator 1's strategy is such that her reputation functionẑ * 1 (t) is given in Figure 1d , then negotiator 2's best reply is to concede to negotiator 1 with certainty before the deadline K * .
Postponing concession beyond time K * is simply not optimal for negotiator 2 because at this time, negotiator 1's reputation will reach to p H and flexible negotiator 2 will prefer conceding to 1 rather than inducing an impasse without a deal with probability p H . Because the growth rate of the concession strategies are fixed and negotiator 2's concession game strategy must be continuous over the interval [0, K * ], which I formally prove in Section 4, negotiator 2 has no choice other than playing a strategy in which it yields the reputation functionẑ * 2 (t) in Figure 1d . That is, negotiator 2 must concede with a positive probability at t = 0. Similarly, not conceding to negotiator 2 at time 0 is a best response for negotiator 1 as well. Note that negotiator 1's reputation does not have to hit one at time K * . All she needs is to build her reputation up to the level p H before the deadline, and she can achieve this-without making an initial concession at time 0-if she picks her deadline no earlier than K * .
To sum, a negotiator who is weak because of her reputational disadvantage can reverse the situation by exit threat. When p H is very high (in particular, if p H ≥z 1 wherez 1 =ẑ 1 (τ 2 ) as presented in Figure 1c ), no deadline would make negotiator 1 strong. 
for i = 1, 2.
1. If z 1 ≥ p H , then negotiator 1 chooses K = 0, negotiator 2 accepts α 1 at time 0 1 with certainty, and negotiator 1 accepts α 2 only at time 0 2 if the game has not ended yet.
, and the concession game strategies are
, ∞ , and the concession game strate-
All the proofs in this section are deferred to the appendix. Theorem 1 characterizes the equilibrium strategies of the flexible negotiators given their first-stage offers. Flexible negotiator 1's type will be revealed at time K 2 (i.e., the second stage of the conventional time K) because the obstinate type will leave the bargaining at time K 1 for sure. Therefore, in equilibrium, flexible negotiator 1 will accept α 2 and finish the game at time K 2 with certainty if the game ever reaches this point. Given this behavior of flexible negotiator 1 and given that the game ever reaches time K, flexible negotiator 2's instantaneous payoff at time K is [1 −ẑ 1 (K)]α 2 if he does not concede to negotiator 1. Here, z 1 ≤ẑ 1 (K) ≤ 1 indicates the posterior probability that negotiator 1 is the obstinate type at time K 1 . However, if flexible negotiator 2 accepts α 1 and finishes the game at time K 1 , then his instantaneous payoff will be 1 − α 1 . Therefore, in equilibrium, flexible negotiator 2 will certainly accept α 2 prior to K if and only ifẑ 1 
The above arguments suggest that if z 1 is sufficiently high (i.e., z 1 ≥ p H ), then negotiator 1
should declare K = 0 in the second stage and force flexible negotiator 2 to concede immediately at time 0. However, if z 1 is less than this threshold, then negotiator 1 should build her reputation prior to the deadline. Therefore, negotiator 1 should choose the deadline no earlier than the
Otherwise, with some positive probability, negotiator 2 never concedes to negotiator 1. Since Bayes' rule implies thatẑ 1 (K * ) =
, we have
It is crucial to note that choosing the deadline K bigger than K * is not optimal for negotiator 1 because the earlier the deadline is, the sooner negotiator 2 accepts α 1 . Since negotiator 1 discounts time, an earlier deadline implies a greater expected payoff for negotiator 1. As a result, negotiator 1 chooses her deadline as K * when z 1 is strictly less than p H and is higher than p L (the requirement p L ≤ z 1 is explained in the next paragraph).
On the other hand, if negotiator 1's initial reputation is very low (i.e., z 1 < p L ), then the time required for negotiator 1 to build her reputation to p H (i.e., K * ) will exceed time
indicating the time that negotiator 2's reputation reaches 1 if he concedes with a constant hazard rate λ 2 with no positive concession at time 0. Therefore, the deadline threat will have no use for negotiator 1 for small values of z 1 , satisfying z 1 < p L .
In equilibrium with α 1 + α 2 > 1 and K > 0, the flexible negotiators are indifferent between quitting at time 0 and waiting for some time t ≤ K and then conceding at this time. Therefore, flexible negotiator i's equilibrium payoff of conceding to negotiator j at any time t is equivalent to what he can achieve at the beginning of this stage (i.e., time 0). Therefore, by equation (1)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ K. Thus, negotiator i's equilibrium game payoff is given by
Definition 1. In any sequential equilibrium of the game G, negotiator i is called strong if F j (0) > 0 and weak otherwise.
Remark 1 According to Theorem 1, in any sequential equilibrium where the negotiators' initial offers are incompatible, only one negotiator can be strong. If negotiator i is weak, then
Then define the set
Note thatᾱ 1 is well defined because set D is nonempty. This is true because for any values of z 1 and z 2 , we can find α 1 sufficiently close to 0 so that sup
is also close to 0, and thus less than z 1 .
According to Theorem 1, negotiator 1's equilibrium choice of K makes her strong except when z 1 is very low (i.e., z 1 < p L ). In that case, negotiator 1 can never make herself strong by her choice of K. Therefore, given negotiator 2's offer α 2 , negotiator 1's best response is
represents the highest possible demand that negotiator 1 could announce in equilibrium-given the fixed parameters z 1 , z 2 , r 1 , and r 2 . If negotiator 1 offersᾱ 1 or anything less thanᾱ 1 , then there is no α 2 > 1 −ᾱ 1 such that negotiator 2 can make himself strong and negotiator 1 weak.
Hence, in any equilibrium, negotiator 1 will choose some α * 1 satisfying α * 1 ≤ᾱ 1 , and so negotiator 2 will be weak. If negotiator 2 makes an incompatible demand in stage 1, then by equation (5), his expected payoff in the game will be strictly less than 1 − α * 1 . Therefore, negotiator 2's best response is to make a compatible demand 1 − α * 1 and finish the game in stage 1. Anticipating this in equilibrium, negotiator 1 will announce the highest possible demand she could pick, which isᾱ 1 , as the previous arguments imply. Hence, the equilibrium is unique, and the negotiators' first-stage offers are compatible. The game never reaches the second stage, where negotiator 1 threatens negotiator 2 with leaving the bargaining table.
Theorem 2. In the unique sequential equilibrium of the game G, negotiator 1 demandsᾱ 1 , negotiator 2 demands 1 −ᾱ 1 , and the game ends at the first stage with no delay. Second, p L (α 1 , α 2 ) increases with α 1 (also see figure 2 ). Therefore,ᾱ 1 satisfies 
B. Insuring Negotiators and Mitigating the Effects of Exit Threat
The previous section considered the default case (i.e., the no-insurance case). In this section, however, I will consider the partial-insurance case: in equilibrium, each negotiator will be compensated (only) when he receives the message c, and the negotiator's continuation payoff when he receives the message c and d will be identical. I prove the following results for this insurance plan, where the negotiators' compensations are minimal. However, the same results would hold when, for example, each negotiator i is ensured to receive a payoff no less than 1 − α j whenever he receives the message c.
Comparing with Theorem 2, the next result unambiguously shows that even if we insure both negotiators, the equilibrium share of the second negotiator, who is unable to use the exit threat, will increase. 10 Moreover, if negotiator 2 is insured by his principal, whose preferences are perfectly aligned with his agent's, then the second negotiator's principal prefers to insure his agent for sufficiently low values of z 2 . Next, I will formally prove all these claims.
More formally, in any equilibrium where α 1 +α 2 > 1 and K ≥ 0, the negotiator i's equilibrium game payoff is
Therefore, the size of the minimal compensation in ex-ante terms is
Note that Theorem 1 holds whether there is partial insurance or not. The equilibrium strategies F 1 and F 2 do not change under partial insurance because these strategies represent the fourth-stage equilibrium behavior of the flexible negotiators. Furthermore, one may naturally suspect that negotiator 1's choice of K should depend on the existence of the partial insurance, but it does not. Recall from the arguments following Theorem 1: lowering K increases negotiator 1's equilibrium payoff in the game as long as negotiator 1's reputation reaches the level p H prior to the time K. This observation holds whether or not there is partial insurance, so the optimal value for K is still given by Theorem 1. That is, K is simply calculated by Bayes' rule and flexible negotiator 1's concession game strategy F 1 .
Theorem 1 and the discussions in the previous section also imply that regardless of the presence of the partial insurance, negotiator 1 will never choose a demand more thanᾱ 1 in equilibrium. If she does, then the second negotiator can profitably deviate to a demand that makes negotiator 1 weak. Therefore, in any equilibrium where negotiators' announced demands are α 1 and α 2 , we must have
Furthermore, if negotiators' announced demands α 1 and α 2 are such that p H (α 1 , α 2 ) < z 1 , then negotiator 1 would be strong in any sequential equilibrium of the game G. In that case, however, negotiator 1's expected payoff (in the game G) would increase with α 1 . That is, negotiator 1 would have incentive to deviate and announce α 1 + for some > 0 small enough so that the inequality p H (α 1 + , α 2 ) < z 1 holds, and thus, the strong negotiator 1 receives a higher expected payoff. For this reason, in any sequential equilibrium where negotiators' initial offers α 1 and α 2 are incompatible, the inequality z 1 ≤ p H (α 1 , α 2 ) must hold.
Thus, for the fixed values of the primitives and for any α 1 , α 2 ∈ [0, 1] such that α 1 + α 2 > 1 define the set
Therefore, the previous arguments imply that z 1 ∈ Z(α 1 , α 2 ) must hold in equilibrium if the negotiators are partially insured. The next theorem characterizes the equilibrium demands in the first stage of the game G given that both negotiators are partially insured. 
Unlike the no-insurance case, there are multiple equilibria in the partial-insurance case. The unique efficient equilibrium is the one that negotiator 1 demandsᾱ 1 . In all other equilibria, negotiator 1's initial offer (i.e., α * 1 ) is less thanᾱ 1 , and the second negotiator makes an incompatible offer in the first stage. In all these inefficient equilibria, negotiator 1 announces a positive exit-time (as characterized in Theorem 1). In particular, given the first-stage demands α * 1 and α * 2 , negotiator 1 announces
It is easy to verify that K * is an increasing function of α * 1 , α * 2 and z 1 , but a decreasing function of r 2 . Similar to the no-insurance case, negotiator 1 will be strong, and negotiator 2 will be weak in any sequential equilibrium under the partial-insurance case. Since negotiator 2 is partially compensated when he receives the message c, his expected payoff in the game will be 1 − α We know from Theorem 2 that if negotiator 1's initial offer is α * 1 and if there is no insurance, negotiator 2's expected payoff in the game will be strictly less than 1 − α * 1 when negotiator 2 makes an incompatible demand in the first stage. Given this, negotiator 2 will never make an incompatible demand in equilibrium. This is the reason for the uniqueness in Theorem 2.
That is, the source of the multiplicity in Theorem 3 is due to negotiator 2's equilibrium payoff.
Therefore, if only negotiator 2 would have been compensated, then there would be multiple equilibria (same as Theorem 3). However, the equilibrium demands would be different from those that are characterized by Theorem 3 because the first negotiator's expected payoff, if negotiator 1 is not compensated, is given by equation (5), not by equation (6) .
In equilibrium where negotiators' initial offers α * 1 and α * 2 are incompatible, the second negotiator's principal should compensate (in ex-ante terms) his agent in the amount of w, which is given by equation (7).
11 If negotiator 2 is not insured, then his expected payoff in the game will be 1 −ᾱ 1 . But if he is insured, then his expected payoff will increase to 1 − α * 1 , and so the difference isᾱ 1 − α * 1 . This difference is greater than w wheneverᾱ 1 − α * Clearly, the principal of the first negotiator does not prefer to compensate her. demand α j .
For each α 2 ∈ [0, 1], BR 1 (α 2 ) can be found by choosing α 1 satisfying z 1 ∈ Z(α 1 , α 2 ) and
can be found by choosing α 2 ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies p L (α 1 , α 2 ) ≥ z 1 and maximizes u 2 = 1 −
. This is true because negotiator 2's expected payoff in this case is 1 − α 1 regardless of his announcement (i.e., α 2 ). Note that there is no equilibrium in which α i = 1 for i = 1, 2. This is true because negotiator j's best response correspondence is not well defined for α i = 1.
The dashed segment of the black line in figure 3 indicates the equilibrium demands in the first stage. One equilibrium demand profile is that α * 1 = 0.6143 and α * 2 = 0.562. In that case, p L = 0.0412 and p H = 0.3137, so z 1 ∈ (p L , p H ) as required. Then in equilibrium, we have K * = 0.7465. Expected payoffs are u 1 = 0.5497 and u 2 = 0.3857. Since u 1 + u 2 = 0.9354 < 1, the expected utility loss is 0.0646.
Example 3: Figure 4 shows that when we fix the values of z 2 , r 1 , and r 2 , the maximal demand choice of negotiator 1 (i.e.,ᾱ 1 ) decreases as z 1 decreases to 0. In the figure, the dashed lines showᾱ 1 , and the solid lines give the equilibrium demands for each z 1 . In this specific example, the parameters are such that z 2 = 0.1, r 1 = 0.7, and r 2 = 0.7, while z 1 takes four different values as indicated in the figure.
The Limiting Case of Complete Rationality: Both Abreu and Gul (2000) and Kambe (1999) show that as the initial probabilities of commitment types decrease to 0, the equilibrium demands converge to a compatible share that purely depends on negotiators' time preferences.
The same conclusion holds for the game G as well.
For this purpose, I first fix the parameters r b and r s . I say the bargaining game G(z 
Concession Game Strategies
In this section, I will characterize the flexible negotiators' fourth-stage sequential equilibrium strategies. Therefore, I take negotiators' demands α 1 , α 2 , and negotiator 1's deadline K as given.
I suppose that α 1 + α 2 > 1 because the game finishes at the first stage when α 1 + α 2 ≤ 1.
Consider any sequential equilibrium in which K = 0. The obstinate type of negotiator 1 leaves the game at time 0 1 . If the game does not end at time 0 1 , then flexible negotiator 1 accepts α 2 at time 0 2 with probability one. This is true because (1) negotiator 1's type will be revealed if she does not leave at time 0 1 , (2) flexible negotiator 1 receives 0 payoff if she leaves the game at time 0 1 , (3) in equilibrium, negotiator 2's type is still not known to negotiator 1 at time 0 2 , and thus, flexible negotiator 1 accepts α 2 at time 0 2 (if the game reaches this point) and finalizes the game for sure. 12 Hence, in equilibrium, the game will end at time 0 (either in stage 0 1 or in 0 2 ) for sure and F 2 (0 2 ) = 0. Proposition 1. In any sequential equilibrium where K = 0 and α 1 + α 2 > 1,
< z 1 , then negotiator 2 concedes at time 0 1 with probability 1 and negotiator 1 accepts α 2 only at time 0 2 . That is, F 1 (0 1 ) = 0, F 1 (0 2 ) = 1 and F 2 (0 1 ) = 1, 2. if z 1 < p H , then negotiator 2 never concedes and negotiator 1 is indifferent between conceding at times 0 1 and 0 2 . That is,
and F 1 (0 2 ) = 1, 3. if z 1 = p H , then negotiator 1 concedes only at time 0 2 and negotiator 2 is indifferent between conceding at time 0 1 and 0 2 . That is,
Proof. It is deferred to Appendix.
Now, consider a sequential equilibrium in which K
. Note that time − Proposition 2. In any sequential equilibrium in which K ∈ [T 0 , ∞) and α 1 + α 2 > 1, we have
Proof. The proof follows from Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson (1988) and is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 in Abreu and Gul (2000).
Finally, I will characterize the flexible negotiators' fourth-stage equilibrium strategies when negotiator 1's deadline K satisfy 0 < K < T 0 . For this purpose, first, consider a history in which no negotiator concedes prior to time t = K. Given the negotiators' equilibrium strategies, let z 1 andẑ 2 denote the posterior probabilities that negotiators 1 and 2, respectively, are obstinate types at time K. It must be the case thatẑ i is greater than or equal to z i . Negotiator 2 believes that negotiator 1 will leave the game at time K 1 with probabilityẑ 1 , in which case flexible negotiator 2's instantaneous payoff is 0. On the other hand, negotiator 1 will concede to negotiator 2 either at time K 1 or time K 2 (depending on her equilibrium strategy) with probability 1 −ẑ 1 , in which case flexible negotiator 2's instantaneous payoff is α 2 . Thus, in equilibrium, negotiator 2 concedes to negotiator 1 at time K 1 with a positive probability if and only ifẑ 1 is high enough.
More formally, given negotiator 1's equilibrium strategy F 1 , let U 2 (Accept at K 1 ) and U 2 (W ait at K 1 ) denote flexible negotiator 2's instantaneous (expected) payoff of conceding and waiting, respectively, at time K 1 . That is, these payoffs are calculated at time K 1 . Thus, U 2 (Accept at K 1 ) ≥ U 2 (W ait at K 1 ) if and only if
where p 1 (K 1 ) indicates the probability that flexible negotiator 1 accepts α 2 at time K 1 .
If
is non-negative for all values of p 1 (K 1 ).
The last two observations imply that, in equilibrium, if negotiator 1's reputation at time K (i.e.,ẑ 1 ) reaches p H and if negotiator 1 concedes to negotiator 2 at time K 1 with some positive probability (i.e., p 1 (K 1 ) > 0), then negotiator 2 should also concede to negotiator 1 at time K 1 . However, if negotiator 2 concedes to negotiator 1 at time K 1 with a positive probability, then flexible negotiator 1 prefers to wait at time K 1 . 13 Hence, in equilibrium, if negotiator 1's reputation at time K ever reaches p H , then negotiator 1 will not concede to negotiator 1 at time K 1 and flexible negotiator 2 will be indifferent between conceding and waiting at this time.
Therefore, the question that we must answer is whether flexible negotiator 1 prefers to build his reputation to p H prior to time K or not. The next result provides an affirmative answer.
Proposition 3. In any sequential equilibrium in which K ∈ (0, T 0 ) and α 1 +α 2 > 1, the following must be true:
1. Equilibrium strategies F 1 and F 2 of stage 4 are continuous and strictly increasing over
. Moreover, F 2 (t) = F 2 (K 1 ) for all t > K 1 and
13 This argument is true because given F 2 (i.e., the second negotiator's strategy),
, negotiator 2 concedes to negotiator 1 at time K 1 with a positive probability).
2. Negotiator 1's reputation at time K 1 (i.e.,ẑ 1 ) reaches exactly p H whenever the second negotiator's reputation at time K 1 (i.e.,ẑ 2 ) is strictly less than 1.
According to Proposition 3, if negotiator 1 does not make a positive probabilistic concession at time 0, then in equilibrium, negotiator 1 should choose her deadline
We get this term by solving the equationẑ 1 (t) = p H that must be satisfied in equilibrium. Note that if negotiator 1 does not make initial probabilistic concession, then c 1 = 1. Therefore, we
Proposition 4. In any sequential equilibrium in which 0 < K < min{K * , T 0 } and
we have
Proof. Negotiator 1 cannot build her reputation to p H at time K 1 if she does not make a positive probabilistic concession. Therefore, c 2 = 1 must hold in equilibrium (since both negotiators cannot make concession at time 0 with positive probabilities). The last observation, together with Proposition 3, gives F 2 . In order to find F 1 (t), we need to solve
Proposition 5. In any sequential equilibrium in which K * < K < T 0 and α 1 + α 2 > 1, we have
Proof. Since K * < K, negotiator 1 has more than sufficient time to build her reputation to p H .
In fact, reputation of negotiator 1 at time K 1 (i.e.,ẑ 1 ) will be strictly higher than p H because F 1 is strictly increasing on [0, K 1 ]. Thus, negotiator 2 strictly prefers to concede at time K 1 .
However, according to Proposition 3, F 2 must be continuous on (0, K 1 ] (i.e., p 2 (K 1 ) must be 0).
These arguments imply that in equilibrium F 2 (K 1 ) = 1. The last equality implies the value of F 2 (t). Since c 2 < 1, we have c 1 = 1, which implies the value of F 1 .
Proposition 6. In any sequential equilibrium in which 0 < K = K * < T 0 and α 1 + α 2 > 1, we
strictly prefers conceding at time K 1 , implying that we must have F 2 (K 1 ) = 1. Because K 1 < T 0 , the last equality is possible only if F 2 (0) > 0. However, in equilibrium, F 1 (0)F 2 (0) = 0 must hold. Thus, we must have F 1 (0) = 0, which implies the value of F 1 . We also have c 2 ≥ z 2 e Proof. It is deferred to Appendix.
Some Extensions
One possible extension of the model is allowing negotiators to use mixed strategies in the first stage. However, this modification would add nothing new but additional technicalities. Theorem 1 and all the results in Section 4 clearly follow in this case. We know from Theorem 1 that in equilibrium, negotiator 1 will choose her deadline such that she is the strong negotiator in the game. Since the second negotiator is weak, he will be indifferent between all the demands in the set [1 − α 1 , 1]. The only difference is that negotiator 1 will be mixing over a subset of [0, 1], which may include demands that are higher thanᾱ 1 .
In what follows, I will consider some (relatively simpler) extensions of the model, where the negotiators sequentially choose their demands. Determining the set of equilibrium demands is not easy because the negotiators' payoff functions are highly complex and discontinuous.
However, I will characterize the conditions that give the set of equilibrium demands.
It is crucial to note that the case where negotiator 1 chooses the deadline K before negotiator 2 chooses his demand α 2 has a completely different set of dynamics. Most of the results in Section 4 and the theorems in Section 3 will no longer be true in this case. Therefore, this specific extension is discarded not because it is unimportant, but because it will make Theorem 1 and the results in Section 4-the core of the equilibrium strategies-invalid. Finally, the following characterizations are done under the assumption that negotiators are partially compensated when they receive the message c. Therefore, negotiator i's expected payoff in the game is given by equation (6) . For the case where the negotiators are not compensated, the utility functions will change as dictated by equation (5).
Sequential demand announcement (negotiator 2 is first): Suppose now that negotiator 2 makes his demand choice first (stage 1), and then negotiator 1 chooses both her demand α 1 and exit-time K (stage 2). The timing of the rest of the game (i.e., stages 3 and 4) are the same as before. In equilibrium, the optimal deadline will be determined according to Theorem 1. Equilibrium values of α * 1 and α * 2 are characterized as follows:
First, start with defining the negotiators' best response correspondences. Given α 2 ∈ (0, 1), negotiator 1's best response correspondence is
Hence, in equilibrium negotiator 2 chooses α * 2 ∈ (0, 1) and negotiator 1 chooses a function α *
BR 1 (α 2 ), and
Sequential demand announcement (negotiator 1 is first): Suppose now that in stage 1 negotiator 1 makes her demand choice first, and then negotiator 2 chooses his demand. In stage 2, negotiator 1 chooses a deadline K. The timing of the rest of the game (i.e., stages 3 and 4) are the same as before. In equilibrium, the optimal deadline is determined by Theorem 1. Equilibrium values of α * 1 and α * 2 are characterized as follows.
If negotiator 1 demands α 1 >ᾱ 1 , then negotiator 2 will choose a correspondence α * 2 : (0, 1) → [1 − α 1 , 1), satisfying that for any α 1 ∈ (0, 1),
However, if negotiator 1 demands α 1 ≤ᾱ 1 , then negotiator 2 will choose any correspondence,
Finally
and
The Case Where Both Negotiators Announce a Deadline: Another possible extension is the case where both negotiators (either sequentially or simultaneously) choose a deadline.
Although this case might be interesting from an analytical perspective, it does not make much sense in practice. In a contract negotiation, for example, when the labor union threatens the management by announcing a deadline for the negotiations, the management is supposed to make a decision between (1) conceding to the union, (2) making an acceptable counteroffer or (3) allowing the labors to leave the bargaining table (e.g., strike). However, making a counterthreat by choosing an earlier deadline is not an expected move from the management.
On the other hand, from an analytical point of view, allowing both negotiators to announce a deadline and to leave the bargaining table gives rise to a significant amount of complexity.
Suppose, for example, that negotiators simultaneously declare an exit-time, where
indicates negotiator i's deadline. If K 1 < K 2 , then it is not clear whether flexible negotiator 1 will accept negotiator 2's demand prior to time K 1 with certainty.
We know from our analyses in Sections 3 and 4 that if only negotiator 1 chooses a deadline, then flexible negotiator 1 will concede to negotiator 2 before or at time K 1 , and so the game will never go beyond this time. This behavior of flexible negotiator 1 affects both negotiators' equilibrium strategies. However, if both negotiators choose a deadline and the difference between K 2 and K 1 is sufficiently small, then flexible negotiator 1 may prefer to wait beyond time K 1 . In equilibrium, negotiator 1's type will be revealed at time K 1 if she does not leave the bargaining table at this time. Likewise, the second negotiator's type will also be revealed at time K 2 .
Therefore, negotiator 1's behavior during the interval [K 1 , K 2 ] depends upon her continuation payoff in the subgame following time K 2 , where both negotiators' types are common knowledge.
That is, we first need to investigate the equilibrium of the concession (i.e., the war of attrition) game between two flexible negotiators. As we know from Hendricks, Weiss, and Wilson (1988), there are multiple equilibria of this game, depending on the negotiators' declared demands at the beginning of the game. Moreover, when both negotiators have the option of leaving the bargaining game, then there also are multiple equilibria even though the negotiators' outside options are 0 and there is no uncertainty on negotiators' types (Ponsati and Sakovics, 1998 ).
This multiplicity issue and the complexity/discontinuity of the negotiators' payoffs are likely to make equilibrium investigation of this particular case inconclusive.
Concluding Remarks and Related Literature
According to the equilibrium calculations, negotiator 1 always chooses the exit-time (i.e., the deadline) positive if the negotiators' initial offers are incompatible. The deadline is a function of both negotiators' initial demands, negotiator 1's commitment probability, and negotiator 2's time preferences. If negotiator 2 is more impatient, then negotiator 1 chooses a shorter deadline.
That is, negotiator 1 applies more time pressure on her rival (by shortening the deadline) if her rival is impatient. There is a tradeoff between initial offers and the length of the deadline: If negotiator 1 makes a greedy offer, then she cannot choose a short deadline because it will not be a credible threat. In equilibrium, negotiators never choose extreme demands, and the exit threat always makes agent 1 advantageous.
In equilibrium, negotiator 1 demandsᾱ 1 -a function of both negotiators' commitment probabilities and time preferences-and negotiator 2 offers 1 −ᾱ 1 , so the game ends in the first stage.
Negotiator 2, who cannot choose a deadline, can mitigate the effects of his rival's threat by insuring himself against some of the utility loss he will suffer when he commits to his demand.
There is multiple equilibria in the partial-insurance case. The upper bound for negotiator 1's equilibrium demands isᾱ 1 . When negotiator 2 is partially compensated, the temptation of reaching a better deal causes delay in equilibria. However, this temptation fades away when negotiator 2 is liable for all the utility losses that occur due to the commitment tactic.
As a possible extension and a new line for future research, it would be interesting to consider a setup where negotiator 1 chooses both her demand and the deadline before the second negotiator makes his offer. This structure allows the second negotiator to modify his demand given the first negotiator's deadline announcement. The equilibrium strategies in this case do not immediately follow from the analyses in the paper. However, intuition suggests that the second negotiator's equilibrium surplus should be higher because negotiator 1 will not be able to position her deadline according to the second negotiator's demand, and thus, she may not always be the strong negotiator in the game.
A model or a theory that helps us understand why and under what conditions bargainers use the "take it or leave it" offers at the first place would be a significant contribution to the literature. For this purpose, we need to study a model where the identity of the negotiator, using the exit threat, is determined in equilibrium endogenously. One theory on this account would be that negotiators may be uncertain about their valuations at the very beginning of the game, and so the size of the surplus that will be divided is incomplete information. Negotiators may prefer to make offers and counteroffers at the very beginning of the game in order to reduce the uncertainty about the rival's type. Once the negotiators' beliefs hit some level, which will be determined in equilibrium, one of them may want to make a "take it or leave it" offer to speed up the process. Since the bargainers discount time, reaching an agreement earlier is always preferable. However, using "take it or leave it" offers at the early stages of the game is risky for a negotiator because the expected loss in case his opponent calls his bluff is larger.
Commitment and exit threats are studied, to some extent, separately in the bargaining literature. Thus, the current work is the first one that combines these two threats. Shelling (1960) points out the potential benefits of commitment in strategic and dynamic environments and asserts that one way to model the possibility of commitment is to explicitly include it as an action players can take. Crawford (1982) , Muthoo (1996) , and Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) follow this approach and show that commitment can be rationalized in equilibrium if revoking commitments is costly. The bargaining models in these papers are one-shot simultaneous-move games. Myerson (1991) , Kambe (1999) , and Abreu and Gul (2000) follow a reputational approach: parallel to Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) , commitments are modeled as behavioral types that exist in society so that rational players can mimic if they like to do so.
14 The bargaining models in the second group of papers are continuous-time, infinitehorizon games, which provide a fruitful platform to examine endogenous deadlines. A common message of the previous results is that commitment threat/tactic benefits a negotiator if this player is the only one who has the option to use it. However, if both negotiators are allowed to use the commitment tactic, then multiple equilibria arise, and inefficiency (that is caused by delay) is a very likely outcome.
The exit threat is studied less in the literature than the commitment threat. Among many others, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) , Vislie (1988) unless the negotiators leave the bargaining table, the negotiations could continue beyond the announced deadline, and opting out is never a best response for the flexible negotiators.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) , and Ponsati and Sakovics (1995), for example, study war of attrition (WOA) games with two-sided uncertainty. Kambe (1999) and Abreu and Gul (2000) take a step forward and add a pre-play to standard WOA games, where the negotiators simultaneously choose their demands that determine their strategy in the WOA phase. The current paper, however, adds another layer to Kambe (1999) and Abreu and Gul (2000) , in which one of the negotiators announces an exit time.
Technically, this paper is closer to Kambe (1999) 15 However, this interpretation leads to a substantially complex model in our setting when there is a large (in particular dense) set of types. In that regard, both Kambe (1999) and the current paper follow an approach leading to a fairly simpler model to work with, where a negotiator's initial probability of being the obstinate type is independent of the demand (and the deadline) the negotiators announce at the beginning of the game.
The second reason for using this approach is that negotiators may (have to) commit to their initial demands or threats depending on how the events unfold during negotiation, and they may be uncertain about whether they will have to commit or not prior to their (demand and deadline) announcements. For example, an agent-who negotiates on behalf of his principalmay have unaligned preferences with his principal and may not know whether the principal will approve his tactic/bluff. In the Dr. Cuddy versus Atlantic Net negotiation, for instance, the board members make it clear to Dr. Cuddy that following a strategy leading to an impasse with the insurance company is not acceptable. However, Dr. Cuddy learns this after she makes her threats. On the other hand, a state leader (or an executive manager) may commit to his demand and deadline if revoking his commitments turns out to be very costly (cost of losing face or credibility of his rhetorics), and the leader may not know the size of this cost for a fact before seeing his audiences' attachment/reaction to his commitments.
Although there are important similarities, the current paper is significantly different from earlier works, which also use the reputational approach, in two aspects. First, in this paper, I
suppose that the obstinate type leaves the bargaining table, and this imposes a deadline effect on reputation building. Second, I consider two separate cases regarding negotiators' equilibrium payoffs: the no-insurance (e.g., Kambe, 1999 ) and partial-insurance cases. These two case studies are important because they are valuable steps towards more detailed investigations on the countermeasures of some bargaining tactics that negotiators extensively use in negotiations.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, I will study the properties of the sequential equilibrium strategies (distribution functions) in the concession game, i. The idea behind the proof of Lemma A.2 is that if negotiator i concedes with a positive probability at some time t ∈ (0, K 1 ), then j prefers to wait during [t − , t] for some > 0 and concede right after time t. This implies that negotiator j's strategy is constant on interval [t − , t]. Therefore, by Lemma A.1 negotiator i's equilibrium strategy is also constant on this interval, contradicting with the initial assumption that i concedes with a positive probability at time t.
Therefore, according to Lemma A.1 and A.2, both F 1 and F 2 are strictly increasing and continuous
To prove the first part of Proposition 3, first note that there is no interval (t , t ) with 0 ≤ t < t < K 1 such that both F 1 and F 2 are constant. Assume on the contrary that t * < K 1 is the supremum of the upper bounds of t 's such that both F 1 and F 2 are constant. However, through lemma A.1, if F i is constant on (t , t * ) for i ∈ {1, 2}, then F j where j ∈ {1, 2}, j = i is constant on (t , t * + η) for some small η > 0. Hence, both F 1 and F 2 are constant on this later interval, contradicting the definition of Finally, since obstinate type of negotiator 1 leaves the game at time K 1 , negotiator 1's type will be revealed at time K 2 . Hence, flexible negotiator 2 will never concede after time K 1 and flexible negotiator 1 will accept α 2 and finish the game before or at time K if the game has not ended before.
To prove the second part of Proposition 3, I suppose thatẑ 2 < 1. Because the equilibrium strategy First note that according to Proposition 3, negotiator 1's reputation must reach p H at time K.
Hence, negotiator 1 needs K * amount of time to build her reputation if z 1 < p H if she does not make any probabilistic concession at time 0. Clearly negotiator 1 can build her reputation to p H much earlier than K * if she makes a probabilistic concession at time 0. However, in this case, negotiator 1's expected payoff in the game will be the lowest payoff she can achieve in the game, that is it will be 1 − α 2 . Therefore, in equilibrium, negotiator 1 will choose K no less than K * .
To prove the first part of Theorem 1, suppose that p H ≤ z 1 . In this case negotiator 1 does not need any time to build her reputation. Also, it is easy to see from the above payoff functions that payoff of negotiator 1 is the highest when she chooses K = 0. Hence, in equilibrium, negotiator 1 will pick K = 0, and the equilibrium strategies in the concession game will be as given in Proposition 1.
To prove the second part, suppose that p L ≤ z 1 < p H . It immediately follows that K cannot be 0. Since p L ≤ z 1 holds, we have K * ≤ T 0 . Thus, negotiator 1 will choose 0 < K ≤ T 0 , and so her equilibrium payoff is one of those given above in CASE 2. Clearly, negotiator 1 does not select K < K * because she can achieve higher. However, for any K satisfying K * < K, negotiator 1 can increase her payoff by choosing an exit-time shorter than K. Therefore, the optimal choice for negotiator 1 is K = K * , and the equilibrium strategies are characterized by Proposition 6.
However, in equilibrium, the value of c 2 is uniquely determined and it is equal to z 2 (1−α 1 ), which is strictly higher than (1−c 2 )α 1 +c 2 (1−α 2 ) for sufficiently small > 0.
Finally to prove the third part of Theorem 1, suppose that z 1 < p L . In this case, we have T 0 < K * and z 1 < z
. Therefore, negotiator 1's expected payoff is as given under (2) in CASE 3. That says, negotiator 1's expected payoff is 1 − α 2 , and is independent of the value of K she chooses. Thus, any K ∈ [T 0 , ∞) forms an equilibrium if F 1 and F 2 are given in Proposition 2.
REMARK: Negotiator 1's expected payoffs in the game, when the negotiators are not compensated, are as follow:
• If K = 0, then as we prove in the proof of Theorem 1.
• If T 0 < K, then
